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Forrest R. Frank 
The dangers posed by the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons among nations 
of the world to international security 
have long been recognized by analysts 
of political and military affairs.1 Prob-
lems for international security posed by 
terrorist acts have also been examined.2 
Recent analysis, however, has focused 
on the nexus of these two different 
threats to international security-
terrorist acquisition and possible use of 
nuclear explosive devices, radiological 
weapons, or attacks on various nuclear 
facilities and installations.3 Few studies 
have examined the problems arising 
from incidents of nuclear terrorism, 
choosing instead to focus solely on the 
feasibility or probability of nuclear ter-
rorism. These studies have resulted in 
significant improvements in efforts to 
protect physically nuclear materials and 
nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly 
those under U.S. jurisdiction.4 How-
ever, the problem of limiting the escala-
tion of conflict arising from terrorist 
acts in which nuclear explosive devices, 
radiological weapons, or attacks on 
nuclear facilities are employed remains 
to be considered. This paper addresses 
this problem. Hopefully it will initiate 
scholarly discussion and analysis. 
Defming Nuclear Terrorism. Nuclear 
terrorism can be defined as the 
unauthorized use or .attempted use of 
nuclear explosive devices, use or 
attempted use of nuclear materials, or 
attacks or attempted attacks on nuclear 
facilities and installations for ex-
tortionate purposes. The victim of 
nuclear terrorism may be an individual, 
a group of individuals, an organization, 
or a government. The primary actor on 
whom the burden of response to nuclear 
terrorism will fall, however, is the gov-
ernment of a nation on whose territory 
nuclear terrorist acts are committed. 
Governments rather than individuals, 
groups of individuals, or organizations 
will assume primary responsibility for 
response because of the scope and 
magnitude of the effects nuclear 
terrorist acts may have on individuals, 
property, and the entire fabric of 
society. 
Four distinct types of nuclear ter-
rorist acts can be considered: overt 
threat to use nuclear explosive devices 
or radiological weapons, or an overt 
threat to attack a nuclear facility; use of 
nuclear explosive devices; use of radio-
logical weapons; and attacks on nuclear 
facilities housing nuclear weapons, 
peaceful nuclear explosive devices, 
nuclear fuel cycle processes and ma-
terials, or nuclear weapons fabrication 
processes and materials. 
How likely is nuclear terrorism? The 
answer to this question depends on 
several factors; however, three factors 
seem particularly significant. The first 
factor is the amount of expertise needed 
to fabricate or otherwise "acquire nuclear 
explosive devices or radiological weap-
ons or to attack various nuclear facili-
ties. The amount of expertise needed to 
fabricate a nuclear explosive device 
varies in inverse proportion to the fis-
sionability of material available. No 
expertise is required to assemble a 
nuclear explosive device if it can be 
stolen intact from the arsenal of a 
nuclear weapon state or a state possess-
ing "peaceful nuclear explosive de-
vices." Considerable expertise is neces-
sary to fabricate a nuclear explosive 
device from uranium highly enriched in 
isotope 235 or 233 or from plutonium. 
Vast amounts of expertise as well as 
considerable capital equipment and 
other economic resources are required 
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to fabricate natural uranium isotope 
238 into a nuclear explosive device. 
It is important to bear in mind that a 
terrorist trying to construct a nuclear 
explosive device does not operate under 
the same rigorous performance con-
straints that bound the efforts of a 
military weapon designer. After all, "a 
clandestine nuclear bomb maker may 
care little whether his bombs are heavy, 
inefficient, and unpredictable. They 
may serve his purposes so long as they 
are transportable by automobile and are 
very likely to explode with a yield 
equivalent to at least 100" tons of 
chemical explosive."s While the amount 
of expertise needed to construct a bomb 
is perhaps no greater than that derived 
from college physics, chemistry, and 
perhaps engineering, the amount of ex-
pertise needed to construct a simple 
device for dispersing radioactive ma-
terial is even less. Any container capable 
of dispensing liquid radioactive waste 
under pressure would be sufficient; 
pouring liquid or particulate radioactive 
materials into air-conditioning systems 
of large buildings or into urban water 
supplies might also represent highly 
effective methods of dispersing some 
radioactive materials. 
The amount of expertise needed to 
attack a nuclear facility depends, in very 
large measure, on the kind of facility to 
be attacked. Some facilities such as 
nuclear weapons fabrication plants are 
heavily guarded and would require a 
sizable force of terrorists for there to be 
much chance of a successful attack. 
Other installations such as nuclear fuel 
fabrication plants, nuclear power re-
"actors, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing 
centers, critical assemblies used in re-
search, and various installations using 
radioisotopes in research, industrial 
processes, or medical treatments might 
require very little military-type ex-
pertise to be successfully overcome. 
The second factor bearing on the 
likelihood of nuclear terrorism is the 
accessibility of nuclear materials to 
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potential nuclear terrorists. There are 
many radioactive substances that might 
be suitable for use as radiological 
weapons. These are materials that could 
be acquired from scientific supply 
houses, industrial materials wholesalers, 
and other types of industries catering to 
the research, teaching, and quality con-
trol market. Most, if not all of these 
substances, however, are not suitable for 
use in nuclear explosive devices. 
There are relatively few materials 
that can be taken off the shelf of a 
chemical supply house or a nuclear 
facy,ity and fabricated into a nuclear 
explosive device. Most of these materials 
are not widely distributed or used out-
side the nuclear power or nuclear ex-
plosives fabrication industries. These 
materials include the following: 
uranium enriched to 90 percent in 
isotope 235 or 233; plutonium; plu-
tonium nitrate in solution; enriched 
uranium isotope 235 hexafluoride; high-
temperature, gas-cooled reactor graph-
ite-coated fuel particles; fuel elements 
for light water reactors using plutonium; 
plutonium oxide and depleted uranium 
oxide pellets used as fuel for liquid 
metal fast breeder reactors, and critical 
assemblies used in physics research on 
college campuses and in industry. 6 
Most, if not all, of these materials are 
regulated by international safeguards 
when transferred from a nuclear weapon 
state to other states; the U.S. Govern-
ment also imposes standards of physical 
security on installations handling these 
materials as well as other materials that 
could, with additional processing, be 
fabricated into nuclear explosive de-
vices. 7 Other nations employ similar 
systems of physical and accounting safe-
guards to minimize the likelihood of 
theft or misuse of these nuclear ma-
terials. Limiting access to these ma-
terials by various methods significantly 
reduces the likelihood that terrorists 
will be able to acquire materials which 
could be fabricated into a nuclear ex-
plosive device. Unfortunately, access to 
materials that could be used in radio-
logical weapons is often not well regu-
lated by national or international safe-
guards. 8 
The third factor that figures promi-
nently in calculating the likelihood of 
nuclear terrorism is the motivation of 
individuals and groups employing ter-
rorist tactics to achieve their political 
and/or economic objectives. While our 
definition of terrorism has excluded 
psychotic or neurotic behavior, de-
ranged individuals might also employ 
nuclear explosive devices, radiological 
weapons, or attack various nuclear 
facilities as a result of their illnesses. 
One analyst has prepared a list of 
potential terrorists and the motivations 
underlying their behaviors: 
Possible Malefactors 
1. Foreign governments and 
their agents, acting under orders. 
2. Sub-units of foreign gov-
ernments and their agents or mili-
tary forces acting with or without 
official sanction. 
3. Individuals or groups en-
gaged in domestic subversive ac-
tivity: extremists, terrorists, nihil-
ists. 
4. Criminals-highly or-
ganized, loosely associated, or in-
dividual. 
5. Psychopaths, severe neu-
rotics, and psychotics, harboring 
sadistic homicidal, or suicidal 
motives. 
6. Mercenaries in the pay of 
others, or who need the money to 
payoff debts, support a heroin 
addiction, etc. 
7. Disgruntled employees 
seeking to sabotage an installation 
for revenge, or out of casual van-
dalism. 
Motives for Nuclear Malfeasance 
1. International enmity or 
rivalry. 
2. Sectional or factional en-
mity, such as civil war, ter-
rorism. 
3. Desire to create panic or 
interrupt electrical power, either 
for its own sake or secondary to 
some other design, such as looting 
under cover of darkness, etc. 
4. Desire to establish credi-
bility of later threats of repeti-
tion, demands for blackmail pay-
ments, etc. 
5. Desire to obtain special 
nuclear materials for bombs. 
6. Desire to obtain radio-
active waste materials for terror, 
homicide, blackmail, or resale. 
Motives 6 and 7 may also subsume 
the desire to control such ma-
terials in order to secure im-
munity from persecution or prose-
cution for the thieves or for 
others as stipulated in threats to 
the authorities. 
7. Sadistic motivation-
merely to cause suffering. This 
might take the form of a specific 
grudge against particular persons 
likely to be killed or injured in a 
nuclear incident, such as em-
ployer, spouse, rival, etc. 
8. Suicidal/homicidal motiva-
tion-to die spectacularly, take 
other lives at the same time. 
9. Publicity motivation to get 
one's name in the papers, or to 
pUblicize some specific cause (a 
frequent motive for aircraft hi-
jacking and terrorism). 
10. Psychotic motivation. This 
can take various forms, depending 
on the nature of the delusional 
system involved.9 
One might add to this list the theft or 
possible use of materials by accident of 
opportunity. Clearly, recent experience 
in the Middle East, in Northern Ireland, 
in Japan, in the United States, in West-
ern Europe, and in Latin America 
illustrates the willingness of individuals 
to use extreme, extortionate violence to 
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attain their political and/or economic 
objectives. 
In calculating the likelihood of nu-
clear terrorism, at least these three 
factors must be simultaneously evalu-
ated. Merely because an individual has 
expertise in the design of nuclear ex-
plosive devices and may have access to 
materials that could be used to fabricate 
such a device, he may not be motivated 
to become a nuclear terrorist. Indeed, I 
suspect that a potential nuclear terrorist 
first would consider using nuclear ma-
terials or attacking nuclear facilities, 
then he would acquire the necessary 
expertise to fabricate a nuclear explo-
sive device, construct a radiological 
weapon, or attack a nuclear facility. 
Finally, he would seek out the appropri-
ate materials to carry out such plans. 
Reasonable people may reach dif-
ferent conclusions about the net threat 
of nuclear terrorism. Some may con-
clude that the threat is not very great; 
others may conclude nuclear terrorism 
is imminent. My own view is that 
nuclear terrorism is probably inevitable. 
We have already witnessed several ter-
rorist or terrorist related incidents in-
volving nuclear materials. 
At least one attempt has been made 
to extort money from government 
officials by an individual threatening to 
destroy a city with a homemade, 
thermonuclear bomb. The attempt was 
thwarted by good police work, not 
because the design of the bomb accom-
panying extortion notes was considered 
defective by government officials. 1 0 
Unknown individuals disseminated 
radioactive materials normally used in 
medicine aboard an Austrian train in 
April 1974, causing much concern if not 
substantial property damage and casual-
ties among railroad passengers. 11 Con-
cern over possible theft of nuclear weap-
ons has mounted in the United States 
over the past few years as various 
shortcomings in the physical security of 
U.S. nuclear weapons have been re-
vealed. In 1974, reports reached the 
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press that a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft 
installation outside Baltimore had been 
broken into in an apparent attempt to 
steal nuclear weapons thought to be 
stored at that installation for use in air 
defense. 12 During the period, 
1973-1975, members of Congress inves-
tigated the security of U.S. nuclear 
weapons stored overseas. Senator 
Symington, commenting on U.S. nu-
clear weapons stored in Korea, reported 
that we "were not being as careful with 
our nuclear stockpile in the Far East as 
we are in Europe.,,1 3 The European 
situation was termed "critical" by 
Senators Pastore and Baker in discus-
sions with Defense Secretary Elliot 
Richardson upon their return from an 
inspection of the U.S. European nuclear 
weapons stockpile.14 While many of 
these deficiencies were corrected in the 
eyes of critical Senators,! 5 the U.S. 
Government intends to continue its 
efforts to upgrade the security of nu-
clear weapons stored at home and 
abroad to the tune of $230 million over 
the period, July 1975 through Septem-
ber 1977.16 
In addition to these problems, there 
have been several known threats against 
nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors 
or uranium enrichment plants.17 The 
crash of a B-52 bomber some 20 miles 
from a nuclear power reactor plant in 
South Carolina1 8 raised the specter of a 
terrorist flying a "kamikaze" mission 
into a nuclear facility. David Krieger 
quotes then Atomic Energy Commission 
Chairman Dr. James Schlesinger, appear-
ing on a radio question-and-answer pro-
gram, discussing this subject with 
typical bluntness and candor: 
If one intends to crash a plane 
into a facility and one is able to 
persuade the pilot that that is the 
best way to go, there is, I suspect, 
little that can be done about the 
problem. 
The nuclear plants that we are 
building today are designed care-
fully to take the impact of, I 
believe, a 200,000 pound aircraft 
arriving at something on the order 
of 150 miles per hour. It will not 
take the impact of a larger air-
craft.19 
Krieger notes that a Boeing 747 "weighs 
about 365,000 pounds and travels con-
siderably faster than 150 miles per 
hour.,,2o Thus, even nuclear power 
plants protected by very strong physical 
security on the ground might be vulner-
able to air attack by kamikaze pilots or 
remotely piloted vehicles. 
We have witnessed only a few inci-
dents resulting in minimal property 
damage, little loss of governmental pres-
tige, and minimal international conflict. 
What will happen, however, if a terrorist 
group succeeds in stealing nuclear ma-
terials, fabricates a bomb, and actually 
detonates it? Furthermore, what will 
happen if the terrorists steal materials 
from one country, fabricate a bomb in 
bases on the territory of a second 
country, and detonate the bomb on the 
territory of yet a third? What will the 
government victimized by a nuclear 
terrorist act do? How will other nations 
respond to the nuclear terrorist incident 
and the countermeasures taken by the 
victim government? We turn now to a 
consideration of the physical effects and 
political consequences of nuclear ter-
rorism. 
The Effects of Nuclear Terrorism. 
There are several physical effects that 
would result from the detonation of a 
nuclear explosive device, the dispersal of 
radioactive material, or the attack on 
various nuclear installations in which 
radioactive material was released. Use of 
nuclear explosive devices by terrorists 
would result in the same types of 
damage caused by military use of nu-
clear weapons. Dispersal of radioactive 
material might cause many of the same 
problems associated with the effects of 
radioactive fallout from atmospheric nu-
clear weapons tests or the long-term 
consequences of the use of nuclear 
weapons. Attacks on various nuclear 
installations resulting in the release of 
radioactive materials might cause a 
broad range of physical effects ranging 
in severity from little more than small 
spills of radioactive material following 
accide'nts involving U.S. nuclear 
weapons in the midair collision of a 
B-52 bomber and a tanker over Spain21 
to the kinds of damage envisioned as the 
result of a nuclear reactor core melt-
down with simultaneous failure of the 
emergency core cooling system. 22 
Terrorist detonation of a nuclear 
explosive device would cause damage 
and casualties as a result of four specific 
forces: blast, thermal radiation, prompt 
nuclear radiation, and long-term nuclear 
radiation. Additionally, disruption of 
communications and malfunctions of 
electronic equipment might occur as the 
result of electromagnetic pulse. The 
severity of these effects would depend 
on a number of factors, including the 
following: yield of the explosion; types 
of materials used in the fabrication of 
the device, height of the device above 
ground at the time of detonation; pre-
vailing wind and weather conditions at 
the time of detonation and for a period 
of hours thereafter; relative hardness of 
the target area; and the amount of 
relief, rescue, and medical aid immedi-
ately available to survivors of blast and 
thermal effects.23 
The effects of terrorist use of radio-
logical weapons are far more difficult to 
predict. Such effects would depend in 
very large measure on the kinds of 
radioactive materials dispersed, the pat-
tern of dispersal, and the length of time 
individuals are exposed to radioactive 
materials. Use of radiological weapons, 
in addition to possibly causing casual-
ties, would result in the contamination 
of a wide range of physical resources 
including land, water supplies, buildings, 
and capital equipment. These effects 
would also occur as a consequence of 
radioactive fallout generated by the 
detonation of a nuclear explosive 
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device. Dispersal of radioactive material 
might not cause casualties; however, it 
would necessitate expensive, time-
consuming, disruptive decontamination 
efforts.24 
Attacks on nuclear facilities in-
tended to cause the release of radio-
active material into the atmosphere are 
perhaps the most difficult forms of 
nuclear terrorism to evaluate in terms 
of physical effects. The nature of the 
work being carried out at the installa-
tion to be attacked, the kind of 
materials and processes used in the 
facility, the difficulty in bypassing 
redundant safety features built into the. 
facility, the ability of the facility effec-
tively to contain released radiation 
within its physical structures or on the 
site, and the degree of physical pro-
tectionagainst direct attack are all 
important variables that affect the 
physical effects of terrorist attacks on 
nuclear facilities. While overcoming 
these obstacles to the release of radio-
active material into the biosphere during 
a terrorist act is a major task, Theodore 
B. Taylor reminds us that criminals have 
been eminently successful in attacking 
heavily fortified buildings and vaults in 
recent years: 
In the last fifteen years more 
than two dozen major thefts from 
modern alarmed vaults wired 
directly to a protective agency 
have been reported. Alarm sys-
tems connected only to the door 
of the secured place have been 
circumvented, and comprehensive 
alarm systems have been success-
fully disconnected. Burglars have 
used diamond-tipped steel drills, 
acetylene torches, twenty-milli-
meter antitank guns, thermic 
lances, explosives, and other 
highly specialized equipment to 
penetrate cement-filled doors, 
steel-reinforced concrete vault 
walls, steel vaults, and steel vault 
doors as much as two feet 
thick.25 
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Taylor argues, in effect, that nuclear 
facilities are vulnerable to attack by 
highly organized, well-equipped terror-
ists just as are Brinks armored trucks, 
large bank vaults, and other "secure" 
installations. 
A broad set of qualifications must be 
introduced in trying to estimate the 
effects of an attack on a nuclear facility 
that results in the release of nuclear or 
radioactive materials into the biosphere. 
The location of the facility in relation 
to large concentrations of civilian or 
military personnel is obviously impor-
tant in estimating casualties. The 
weather at the time of the incident and 
for a period of hours thereafter is also an 
important factor. The extent to which 
the site of such an attack was cut off 
from outside assistance would also 
affect the number and extent of casual-
ties, as would the reaction of individuals 
displaced by preventative or rescue and 
relief efforts. Mass panic arising from 
fear, hasty and poorly planned evacu-
ation of areas, unconfirmed rumors, et 
cetera, could claim large numbers of 
lives through accidents, coronaries, and 
the withdrawal of medical services by 
overworked, frightened, and perhaps in-
jured medical personnel. 2 6 
The ability of terrorists to acquire 
and use nuclear explosive devices or 
radiological weapons, or to attack 
successfully nuclear facilities causing the 
release of radioactive material into the 
biosphere may lead to wild speculation 
about the number of casualties in vari-
ous scenarios. While numbers are some-
what hard to pin down, there are many 
factors which influence the severity of 
casualties resulting from blast, thermal 
radiation, prompt nuclear radiation, and 
long-term radiation. The types of 
materials used, weather, distribution of 
radioactive materials, length of exposure 
to radiation sources, and the reaction of 
the victims of nuclear terrorist acts all 
bear on the severity of the physical 
effects of nuclear terrorism. The physi-
cal effects of nuclear terrorism, in tum, 
may substantially affect the political 
consequences of nuclear terrorism. We 
tum now to a consideration of this 
aspect of the problems posed by nuclear 
terrorism. 
The Political Consequences of Nu-
clear Terrorism. There is a variety of 
political consequences arising from inci-
dents of nuclear terrorism that affect 
governments of many states in addition 
to the government of the state vic-
timized by nuclear terrorist acts. While 
the latter is necessarily faced with the 
most difficult choices in responding to 
and coping with the effects of nuclear 
terrorism, a number of factors very 
quickly brings other governments into 
contact With the political fallout of a 
nuclear terrorist act. While the broad 
range of specific acts of nuclear ter-
rorism and the incalculable number of 
potential targets make it impossible to 
detail all the possible consequences of 
nuclear terrorism, analysts should try to 
understand those types of consequences 
or actions that would be particularly 
important in controlling the escalation 
of international conflict following an 
incident of nuclear terrorism. 
There are at least four major types of 
consequences or actions that merit 
attention. First, we should consider how 
the government of a victimized state 
will react to the nuclear terrorist act. 
Second, we should examine how other 
states will perceive the victim's actions 
and reactions to nuclear terrorism. 
Third, we must consider the actions of 
the government of the state ravished by 
nuclear terrorism toward other states. 
Finally, we should contemplate the 
broad systemic consequences of nuclear 
terrorism for international relations 
generally. 
The government of a state which is 
attacked by nuclear terrorists in any of 
the four broad types outlined above is 
immediately confronted with several 
problems. It must determine if a threat 
to use nuclear explosive devices or 
radiological weapons or to attack nu-
clear facilities is credible, or it must 
verify the actual occurrence of a ter-
rorist act. Second, it must identify the 
most probable perpetrators of nuclear 
terrorism independently of various 
claims of responsibility. Third, it must 
cope with a variety of domestic prob-
lems generated by nuclear terrorism. 
Casualties must be treated; the homeless 
resettled; property, buildings, capital 
equipment, and farmland must be de-
contaminated; and the faith of citizens 
in their government's ability to protect 
them must be restored. 
The actions taken by the government 
of a state ravished by nuclear terrorism 
directed solely within its own territory 
to cope with nuclear terrorism may 
nonetheless precipitate major interna-
tional crises leading to international 
conflict. A number of actions taken in 
the absence of confirmation that nu-
clear terrorist acts have occurred are 
ambiguous; given the presence of latent 
or manifest conflict between two 
nations or two sets of nations, these 
actions might be interpreted as prepara-
tions for war. For example, evacuation 
of cities, censorship of news, drastic 
changes in patterns or modes of internal 
communication, suspension of regular 
commerce, declarations of martial law 
or changes in civil police procedure, 
limited or general military mobilization, 
or redeployment of military forces-in-
being might all be reasonable steps for a 
government trying to cope with nuclear 
terrorist acts to take. Each of these 
measures or a combination of such 
measures might also be perceived as 
preliminary preparations for war.2 7 
This interpretation seems especially 
likely in those cases where previous real 
or alleged incidents of terrorism have 
precipitated reprisals by the victimized 
state against its neighboring states or 
other states thought to have been 
responsible for the initial terrorist 
act. 23 
The government of a state trying to 
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cope with nuclear terrorism might also 
undertake a variety of nonmilitary and 
military measures against one or more 
other states. Likely targets of these 
actions include states thought to have 
supplied nuclear materials to terrorist 
groups; states assumed to have harbored 
nuclear terrorist groups before and/or 
after commission of terrorist acts; states 
thought to have supplied nuclear ter-
rorists with nonnuclear supplies, techni-
cal resources, expertise, or money. The 
government of the victim state might 
tum to other states for the extradition 
of any individual alleged to have been 
involved in the nuclear terrorist inci-
dent. States might also seek interna-
tional cooperation and assistance in 
identifying the llources of nuclear ma-
terials used in the fabrication of nuclear 
explosive devices or radiological 
weapons. Claims for indemnification of 
individuals, organizations, and govern-
ments suffering personal injury and 
property loss as the result of nuclear 
terrorism might be filed against various 
states, including nuclear materials 
supplying states as well as nuclear 
materials recipient states. 
The use of military force in response 
to nuclear terrorism by the victim state 
cannot be overlooked. Military force 
could be deployed against the same 
wide variety of states noted above. The 
range of military actions that could be 
undertaken could vary greatly from 
minimum efforts to close the border 
between the victim state and its neigh-
bors to more drastic actions. These 
actions might include some or all of the 
following: interdiction of terrorist infil-
tration routes; attacks on terrorist base 
camps; .embargo or blockade of states 
aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists 
to operate from their territories; attacks 
on the civilian population of other 
states roughly equaling the destruction 
caused by a nuclear terrorist act; 
destruction of other states' nuclear 
facilities; or even a full-scale invasion 
and occupation of other states in 
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reprisal for nuclear terrorism 
It is clear that acts undertaken by the 
victim state toward other states would 
have profound effects on international 
order. The military actions described 
above would be sufficient to unleash a 
major war, depending on the states 
directly involved and the strength of 
their respective alliance systems. Inci-
dents of nuclear terrorism involving 
materials nominally under international 
safeguards would. automatically raise 
very serious questions about the reli-
ability of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear 
materials. IAEA inspection of national 
nuclear materials accounts, the primary 
safeguard against diversion of nuclear 
materials, that fail to detect the diver-
sion of nuclear materials subsequently 
thought to have been used in the com-
mission of a nuclear terrorist act may 
raise very grave questions about the 
entire safeguards system. Such questions 
once raised would be very hard to quiet, 
hence weakening the IAEA's ability to 
perform its critical function of verifying 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29 
Nuclear terrorism may also raise a 
number of problems relating to the 
obligations assumed by the nuclear 
weapon states in their adherence to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-
Security Council Resolution 255, (19 
June 1968).3 0 The nuclear weapon 
states might find themselves in a posi-
tion of direct confrontation with one 
another because of demands on the part 
of the government of the state attacked 
by nuclear terrorists for assistance. 
Furthermore, use of nuclear terrorism 
by a group claiming the status of a state, 
i.e., a liberation movement, might cause 
major political problems.in relations 
among the nuclear weapon states, as 
well as between the nuclear weapon 
states and nonnuclear weapon states. 
Successful nuclear terrrorism might 
also give rise to more general security 
problems without regard to actions 
undertaken by the victim state. All 
states would become concerned about 
nuclear terrorism and might undertake 
actions that could easily be misinter-
preted by other, potential adversaries. 
Successful nuclear terrorism in one part 
of the world might be an invitation to 
terrorists in other parts of the world to 
use nuclear explosive devices, radiologi-
cal weapons, or attacks on nuclear 
facilities as an effective, spectacular 
means of achieving political and eco· 
nomic objectives. Government leaders 
might conceivably be faced with a new 
set of dominoes-nuclear facilities, 
sources of radioactive materials, or 
sources of fissionable materials. 
In surveying the political conse· 
quences of nuclear terrorism, it becomes 
clear that nuclear terrorism creates 
problems which, in turn, may be more 
destructive over the long term than the 
act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation 
of hostilities between two or more 
states as the result of a catalytic nuclear 
terrorist act ought to be an outcome 
over which great efforts would be ex-
pended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortu-
nately, little attention has been paid to 
the problem of limiting the escalation of 
conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. 
We now turn to some possible steps that 
might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, 
or multilaterally by nations of the world 
to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a 
nuclear terrorism incident. 
Limiting the Escalation of Interna-
tional Conflict Arising from Nuclear 
Terrorism Nuclear terrorism can be 
analyzed in traditional arms control 
terms with considerable improvement in 
understanding of the problems to be 
solved. The objective in developing 
mechanisms to cope with nuclear terror-
ism is to reduce the likelihood of war 
and, failing that, to minimize the effects 
of war should it occur. 
Nuclear terrorism is an inherently 
ambiguous event. Thus, there is a need 
for all parties-states, international 
organizations, and terrorists-to verify 
many different aspects of terrorism. In 
addition to verification, there is a need 
to develop a set of incentives and 
penalties, as well as a means of en-
forcing these incentives and penalties to 
discourage the escalation of interna-
tional conflict as the result of a nuclear 
terrorist act. There is also a need to 
detect attempts to employ nuclear ter-
rorism so that appropriate, non-
escalatory countermeasures can be 
taken. Let us examine each of these 
problems momentarily. 
The state attacked by nuclear terror-
ists has several distinct verification prob-
lems. First, it needs to determine 
whether or not it is under attack by 
terrorists, by unauthorized action by 
regular military forces of another state, 
or by a clandestine military operation 
mounted by another state. The govern-
ment of the state under nuclear terrorist 
assault must also verify the use of 
nuclear explosive devices, radiological 
weapons, or the successful attack on 
nuclear facilities so that it may under-
take appropriate decontamination 
actions as well as mobilize necessary 
medical and relief personnel. 
Other states, too, have a vested in-
terest in confirming the identity of 
nuclear terrorists. Some states may find 
themselves committed to military action 
by treaty or executive agreement unless 
it can be established that their ally, the 
victim of a nuclear terrorist act, is not 
under an authorized military assault 
from another state. States with nuclear 
weapons or peaceful nuclear explosive 
devices may also be very concerned 
about the identity of nuclear terrorists 
as well as the source of nuclear materials 
because of their concern about possible 
breakdowns in command and control 
over their own nuclear weapons. 
Potential adversaries of the victim of 
nuclear terrorism require verification of 
a number of acts. First, they too need 
to verify that nuclear terrorist acts are 
committed by terrorists and not agents 
provocateur on the one hand, or that 
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alleged nuclear terrorist acts are not 
simply a pretext for the victim to 
initiate hostilities against one or more 
potential adversaries on the other. 
Second, potential adversaries of the 
victim state need confirmation of 
nuclear terr.orism incidents to interpret 
what are otherwise ambiguous events in 
the victim country. Other countries 
neither aligned with the victim or 
potential adversaries require verification 
of nuclear terrorist acts so that they 
may be able to assist in the management 
of crises by refusing havens to alleged 
nuclear terrorists, providing rescue and 
relief supplies and personnel, and 
offering their good offices to mediate 
disputes arising between the government 
of the target state and other states it 
feels are responsible for nuclear ter-
rorist acts. 
In addition to coping with the prob-
lems of ambiguity inherent in real or 
alleged acts of nuclear terrorism, in the 
domestic responses to nuclear terrorism, 
and in the international responses to 
nuclear terrorism, attention should be 
paid to the development of mechanisms 
that militate against both domestic and 
international escalation of conflict 
arising from incidents of nuclear terror-
ism. One set of possible remedies ad-
dresses some of the underlying motiva-
tions for escalation on the part of the 
victim state. Another set of possible 
remedies looks at the problem of 
limiting the scope and magnitude of 
escalation in the event of nuclear terror-
ism. 
There are a number of factors that 
would tend to encourage the govern-
ment of a state ravished by nuclear 
terrorist acts to lash out at real or 
imagined enemies in an effort to cope 
with the problems raised by nuclear 
terrorism. One of the incentives to 
lashing out would be to apprehend and 
bring to justice those individuals 
directly responsible for nuclear terrorist 
acts. An arrangement providing for the 
prosecution or extradition for 
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prosecution of individuals alleged to 
have participated in nuclear terrorism 
analogous to the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft3 1 may be a useful measure in 
the management of crises arising from 
nuclear terrorism. While this kind or" 
guarantee of prosecution may not deter 
terrorists, it may discourage states from 
kidnapping alleged nuclear terrorists on 
the territory of other states and forcibly 
returning these individuals to the victim 
state for prosecution.* Such actions 
might cause very serious problems for 
the relations among the states directly 
involved in the "forcible extradition" of 
alleged nuclear terrorists. 
Agreement in some form might also 
be reached to provide for the compensa-
tion of individuals suffering injury or 
property loss as the result of nuclear 
terrorism. Such an agreement might 
contain a flat limitation of liability 
comparable to the Price-Anderson in-
surance arrangement for the U.S. nu-
clear industry;32 it might have pro-
visions for sharing of costs among all 
nuclear materials supplying and re-
ceiving nations. If some mechanism 
could be developed to minimize the 
financial losses incurred by govern-
ments, private citizens, and various eco-
nomic entities as the result of nuclear 
terrorism, the government of the state 
injured by nuclear terrorism might be 
better able to resist internal public 
opinion and bureaucratic pressures to 
resort to the use of military force to 
redress the grievances of its citizens 
against other states. 
*The kidnapping and forcible extradition 
of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to Israel 
in May 1960, resulted in a considerable 
increase in tensions between those two states 
until August 1960, when the two govern-
ments agreed to drop the matter of forcible 
extradition. The issue did arise during Eich-
mann's trial when the defense challenged the 
competence of the Israeli court to try Eich-
mann because of his extralegal extradition to 
Israe1.33 
S.ome form of agreement to prose-
cute or extradite individuals accused of 
participating in nuclear terrorism and 
another agreement to provide compen-
sation to the victims of nuclear terror-
ism may take some escalatory pressures 
out of nuclear terrorism from the per-
spective of the victim. Neither agree-
ment, however, will do much to aid in 
the verification or detection problems 
alluded to earlier. Here, there are some 
recent developments worth noting that 
augur well for improved international 
capability to detect nuclear terrorism. 
Earlier in this paper, it was observed 
that limiting access to nuclear materials 
seemed to be tl).e easiest, surest way to 
reduce the likelihood of nuclear terror-
ist incidents. An agreement was con-
cluded among the seven major nuclear 
materials supplying nations-the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany-imposing 
a variety of physical safeguards on 
nuclear materials supplied to other 
states under agreements for cooperation 
safeguarded by the IAEA. While the 
exact content of the agreement has not 
been made public, newspaper accounts 
suggest that the kind of physical protec-
tion demanded would be sufficient to 
improve greatly the likelihood of de-
tecting attempts to steal nuclear ma-
terials in transit from supplier to re-
cipient as well as from stockpiles of 
materials already in the hands of the 
recipient nation.3 4 
National intelligence networks rely-
ing on both national technical means of 
verification and a variety of other 
human assets and analytical techniques 
may be able to aid in the verification of 
attempted or successful acts of nuclear 
terrorism. 3 5 The critical problem is the 
distribution of intelligence data from 
one country to another in a manner that 
does not compromise intelligence 
sources and methods, but nonetheless 
permits all concerned to verify nuclear 
terrorist acts, domestic responses to 
such acts, the possible attempt at nu-
clear terrorism, and other related ac-
tions.36 
The use by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) of intelli-
gence data on possible airplane hijackers 
provided by member nations may be a 
useful model on which to base a similar 
scheme of intelligence data sharing. 
Apparently, when a national intelligence 
organization detects a possible airplane 
hijacking attempt, it alerts the ICAO. 
The ICAO in turn distributes this in-
formation directly to all member 
nations. Thus, member states are alerted 
to the dangers of airplane hijackings 
without anyone nation's intelligence 
sources and methods being unduly com-
promised.3 7 
Another possible approach to the 
problem of verification of nuclear ter-
rorist acts and various domestic actions 
taken by the victim government might 
be "verification by challenge" as formu-
lated in the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion.31\ There is no formal on-site in-
spection or other verification of the 
destruction or diversion "to peaceful 
purposes ... of all agents, toxins, weap-
ons, equipment, and means of de-
livery ... " of bacteriological (biologi-
cal) methods of warfare.39 However, 
there are provisions for verification in 
the event a nation believes another is 
engaging in questionable acts. Article VI 
provides: 
(1) Any State Party to this 
Convention which finds that any 
other State Party is acting in 
breach of obligations deriving 
from the provisions of the Con-
vention may lodge a complaint 
with the Security Council of the 
United Nations. Such a complaint 
should include all possible evi-
dence confirming its validity, as 
well as a request for its considera-
tion by the Security Council. 
(2) Each State Party to this 
Convention undertakes to 
543 
cooperate in carrying out any 
investigation which the Security 
Council may initiate in accord-
ance with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations, on 
the basis of the complaint re-
ceived by the Council. The 
Security Council shall inform the 
States Parties to the Convention 
of the results of the investiga-
tion.40 
Verification by challenge would be par-
ticularly useful in better understanding 
the actions of the government of the 
state trying to cope with the aftermath 
of nuclear terrorism. Other states would 
already have some information based on 
diplomatic reports; verification of 
nuclear terrorism by challenging specific 
domestic responses would be beneficial 
in clarifying ambiguous acts without 
necessarily forcing potential adversaries 
to take actions which the victim state 
would regard as hostile. 
Clearly, verification of nuclear ter-
rorism could not be handled exactly the 
same way as verification of biological 
weapons manufacture or stockpiling. 
There would be many objections to the 
use of the U.N. Security Council as the 
primary investigating organ. Some kind 
of ad hoc arrangement drawn from 
governments allied with the state vic-
timized by nuclear terrorism, the victim 
state's potential adversaries, and states 
nominally "nonaligned" in the context 
of the possible dispute with technical 
support by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's office of the Inspector 
General might be a more appropriate 
verifying force. However, if the burden 
for verifying incidents of nuclear terror-
ism can be removed from the shoulders 
of the victim government and its poten-
tial adversaries, the chances of managing 
crises successfully are probably en-
hanced. 
There are a number of other areas 
that might lead to conflict that will 
eventually have to be addressed. Time 
and space permit only a cursory 
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description of the problems yet to be 
addressed. 
First, how are nuclear materials re-
covered from thefts, unsuccessful at-
tempts at nuclear terrorism, et cetera, to 
be handled? Who shall pay recovery 
costs? Who shall insure that these re-
covered materials are adequately ac-
counted and safeguarded so that they 
do not become the source of second or 
third order nuclear terrorist weapons? 
Second, how shall existing safeguards 
be enforced? The present IAEA safe-
guards system merely requires that evi-
dence of safeguard violations be pre-
sented to the Board of Governors-22 
national representatives-who may act 
as they deem fit. Might the world be 
somewhat better off if a clear schedule 
of pena!ties for violation of interna-
tional· safeguards be established? 
Third, what is the future role of the 
IAEA to be in any scheme of nuclear 
materials safeguarding and the coping 
with problems of nuclear terrorism? The 
IAEA has become more and more re-
luctant to take a vigorous leading role in 
developing physical security standards, 
procedures, and technology, alleging it 
lacks the budget and manpower neces-
sary to accomplish these tasks. What 
changes, if any, in the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
might be in order so that it could be a 
more vibrant force in helping nations 
cope with the aftermath of nuclear 
terrorist acts? 
Finally, what additional steps should 
be taken to enlarge the scope of na-
tional and international safeguards on 
nuclear materials? Some might argue 
that a large number of materials that 
could be used in a variety of terrorist 
weapons are presently beyond the scope 
of national or international safeguards. 
Given the magnitude of the risks these 
materials pose to international order, 
might this be the time to develop 
safeguards on radioactive elements used 
in industrial research, nuclear 
medicine, college teaching, and other 
places that might be diverted to ter-
rorist use? 
These questions lead us directly to 
the need for an agenda of actions that 
can be taken over the next few years. 
An Agenda for Action. The problem 
of nuclear terrorism will go away only 
when the more general problem of 
terrorism has been solved. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider a number of uni-
lateral, bilateral, and multilateral steps 
that can be taken to minimize the 
likelihood of escalation of conflict 
arising from incidents of nuclear terror-
ism. 
Clearly, one of the most important 
and perhaps most easily accomplished 
tasks is to restrict vastly the worldwide 
supply of materials from which a fission 
nuclear explosive device could be 
fashioned until such time as stringent 
physical security standards are de-
veloped, put in place, and enforced by 
suppliers of nuclear materials. The Janu-
ary 1976 agreement referred to above is 
clearly a step in the right direction. 
Second, I believe there is a need for a 
unilateral declaration on the part of the 
United States on the seriousness of 
nuclear terrorism. Such a statement 
should, in my view, include a call for a 
policy of "no safe havens" for nuclear 
terrorists, preferably to be codified in 
an international treaty. 
Third, I believe there needs to be a 
concerted effort to initiate international 
discussions on ways to minimize the 
escalation of conflict arising from nu-
clear terrorism. While the conclusion of 
additional agreements providing world-
wide communications modeled after the 
United States-Soviet "Hot Line Agree-
ment" would be useful, I think it is very 
important that we not lose our perspec-
tive on technology. Nuclear technology 
has a habit of failing; it can be made to 
fail. I believe we need to look beyond 
technological "fixes" to the problem of 
nuclear terrorism and deal with the 
"people" problem terrorism implies. 
At the same time, we should be alert 
to the dangers some remedies to the 
problem of nuclear terrorism may pose 
to civil liberties, freedom of information 
exchange, and freedom of movement of 
peoples across international frontiers. A 
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balancing of the rights and interests of 
many diverse groups must take place; 
hopefully it will take place before we 
must cope with incidents of nuclear 
terrorism that result in severe escalation 
of international conflict. 
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